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Importation of drugs into the U.S. would result in a decline in U.S. drug prices.  The purpose of this
paper is to assess the consequences of importation for new drug development. A simple theoretical
model of drug development suggests that the elasticity of innovation with respect to the expected price
of drugs should be at least as great as the elasticity of innovation with respect to expected market size
(disease incidence).  I examine the cross-sectional relationship between pharmaceutical innovation
and market size among a set of diseases (different types of cancer) exhibiting substantial exogenous
variation in expected market size.  I analyze two different measures of pharmaceutical innovation:
the number of distinct chemotherapy regimens for treating a cancer site, and the number of articles
published in scientific journals pertaining to drug therapy for that cancer site.  Both analyses indicate
that the amount of pharmaceutical innovation increases with disease incidence.  The elasticity of the
number of chemotherapy regimens with respect to the number of cases is 0.53.  The elasticity of MEDLINE
drug cites with respect to cancer incidence throughout the world is 0.60.  In the long run, a 10% decline
in drug prices would therefore be likely to cause at least a 5-6% decline in pharmaceutical innovation.
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Importation of drugs into the U.S. may soon become legal.  Since prices of drugs 
are lower in most other countries than they are in the U.S., importation would result in a 
decline in U.S. drug prices.  The price decline would benefit U.S. consumers in the short 
run.  However, importation may have two other effects that could reduce the welfare of 
U.S. consumers.  First, importation could reduce the quality, or safety, of drugs 
purchased by Americans, and increase the number of adverse drug events.  Second, 
importation could reduce the number of new drugs developed in the future by reducing 
the expected profitability of new drug development.  In previous papers (Lichtenberg 
(2005a, 2005b, 2005c)), I have shown that the introduction of new drugs has increased 
longevity and ability to work, and reduced utilization of hospitals and nursing homes.   
Therefore, while importation may yield an increase in static efficiency (lower 
drug prices), it may also result in reduced dynamic efficiency (fewer new drugs 
developed).  Schumpeter (1947, p. 190, italics in original) suggested that, in general, 
consumer welfare depends more on dynamic efficiency than it does on static efficiency: 
“we shall call that system relatively more efficient which we see reason to expect would 
in the long run produce the larger stream of consumers’ goods per equal unit of time.” 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the consequences of importation for new 
drug development.  One way to do this is to estimate the elasticity of drug development 
with respect to the expected price of drugs.
1, 2   This approach requires substantial 
exogenous variation in expected drug prices, which may be hard to find.  I will pursue an 
alternative approach: I will attempt to estimate the elasticity of drug development with 
respect to expected market size.  In Section I, I will present a simple theoretical model of 
drug development which suggests that the elasticity of investment with respect to the 
expected price of drugs should be at least as great as the elasticity of investment with 
respect to expected market size.  In section II, I will examine the cross-sectional 
relationship between pharmaceutical innovation and market size among a set of diseases 
                                           
1 Abbott and Vernon (2005) review the literature on the linkages between pharmaceutical price regulation, 
profits, cash flows, and investment in R&D.   
2 Danzon et al (2005) and Kyle (2005) examine the effect of prices, or price controls, on the probability and 
timing of launch of existing drugs in different countries.  Danzon et al (2005) present evidence that 
countries with lower prices or smaller market size experience longer delays in access to new drugs.  Kyle 
(2005) found that companies delay launch into price-controlled markets, and are less likely to introduce 
their products in additional markets after entering a country with low prices.   4
(different types of cancer) exhibiting substantial exogenous variation in expected market 
size.  In section III, I will consider the implications of the estimates, and compare them to 
estimates from previous studies. 
 
I.  A simple theoretical model of drug development 
 
Suppose that the cost function of the pharmaceutical firm is linear, i.e. that there 
is a fixed cost and that marginal cost is constant: 
 
C = CF + m Q  




C = total cost 
CF = fixed cost 
m = marginal cost 
Q = quantity 
CV = variable cost = m Q 
 
The fixed cost (CF) is likely to be very large relative to marginal cost.  In 2003, the Tufts 
Center for the Study of Drug Development reported that the fully capitalized cost to 
develop a new drug, including studies conducted after receiving regulatory approval, 
averages $897 million.
3  In 2002, the average U.S. price of a generic prescription—which 
may be close to marginal cost—was $30.   
Given this cost function, the firm’s profit function is: 
 
Π = R - C 
    = P Q – (CF + CV) 
    = P Q –  m Q - CF   
    = R - CV – CF 




Π = profit 
R = revenue = P Q 
                                           
3 http://csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid=29   5
P = price 
ΠV = variable profit = revenue – variable cost = (P – m) Q 
 
The firm will be willing to invest (incur the fixed cost CF) if it expects “variable profit” 
(revenue minus variable cost) to exceed fixed cost.  This theory of investment in 
innovation is quite consistent with Scherer’s (2001, p. 220) “virtuous rent-seeking 
model” of pharmaceutical industry R&D, in which, “as profit opportunities expand, firms 
compete to exploit them by increasing R&D investments, and perhaps also promotional 
costs, until the increases in costs dissipate most, if not all, supranormal profit returns.” 
Suppose we regard both fixed and marginal cost as given.  Exogenous changes in 
price or quantity change variable profit, and therefore may affect whether of not the firm 
is willing to invest.   
If the firm were an unregulated monopolist facing a linear inverse demand curve 
P = a – b Q, the profit-maximizing price would be P* = (a + m) / 2, and the profit-
maximizing quantity would be Q* = (a – m) / 2 b.  However, suppose that the firm is 
prevented, by reimportation or regulation, from charging the profit-maximizing price.  
The actual price it can charge, P, may be lower than P*.  I want to assess the sensitivity of 
variable profit (hence willingness to invest) to exogenous changes in P, and compare it to 
the sensitivity of variable profit to exogenous “demand shocks” (e.g., changes in market 
size). 
A change in P has an indirect as well as a direct effect on variable profit, via the 
demand function.  Suppose that the demand function is log-linear rather than linear: 
 





ln Q = ln N - β ln P 
 
where N is the number of consumers and β is the elasticity of demand.  I assume that the 
elasticity of Q with respect to N is one, e.g. a 10% increase in disease incidence would 
cause quantity demanded to increase 10%, holding price constant. 
Then we may write 
 
 ln  ΠV = ln(P – m) + ln Q   6
 
          = ln(P – m) + ln N - β ln P 
 
The elasticity of variable profit with respect to the number of consumers is one.  The 
elasticity of variable profit with respect to price is 
 
δ ln ΠV  =    P     -  β 
 δ ln P      P – m 
 
 
   =         1         - β 
       1 – (m / P) 
 
Suppose, for a moment, that the demand for pharmaceuticals were completely inelastic: β 
= 0.  In this case  
 
δ ln ΠV  =         1         > 1 = δ ln ΠV   
 δ ln P       1 – (m / P)            δ ln N 
    
The elasticity of variable profit with respect to price is greater than one, and is therefore 
greater than the elasticity of variable profit with respect to the number of consumers.  If 
demand were completely inelastic, variable profit would be more sensitive to price than it 
is to market size.  A reduction in the number of consumers reduces cost as well as 
revenue, whereas a reduction in price reduces only revenue.   
To calculate the elasticity of variable profit with respect to price when demand is 
completely inelastic, we require only an estimate of (m / P), the reciprocal of the price-
cost margin.  Hughes et al (2002, p. 6), citing Grabowski and Vernon (1992, 1996), note 
that “once multiple generic manufacturers enter [the market following patent expiration], 
they typically price their drugs at discounts of 70 to 90 percent below the incumbent’s 
price prior to entry. This observation implies that the ratio of price to marginal cost for 
branded drugs with patent protection is about 6:1.”  If (m / P) = 1/6, the elasticity of 
variable profit with respect to price when demand is completely inelastic is 1 / (1–(1/6)) = 
1.20. 
However, other evidence suggests that the mean ratio of generic price to branded 
price is much higher.  Data from the 2002 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey indicate 
that the mean price of generic prescriptions was $30 (N = 124,555), and that the mean   7
price of branded prescriptions was $75 (N = 189,312), so the ratio of mean prices was 
0.40.  However, this ratio compares prices of different products, e.g. antibiotics and 
cardiovascular drugs.  We can calculate the mean percentage differential of the prices of 
generic and branded versions of the same product by estimating the following model: 
     ln Pij = δ GENERICij + αj + εij 
where  
 
Pij   = the price of the i
th prescription for product j 
GENERICij   = 1 if the i
th prescription for product j is a generic prescription 
   =  0 if the i
th prescription for product j is a branded prescription 
αj   = a fixed effect for product j, where a product is defined by active 
ingredient(s), dosage form, strength, and route of administration
4 
 
The estimate of the within-product price differential δ, based on data on 258,276 
prescriptions for 2235 products, is -.317 (t-statistic = 65.3).  This implies that the mean 
ratio of the price of a generic prescription to the price of a branded prescription for the 
same product is 0.73 (= exp(-.317)).  If (m / P) = 0.40, the elasticity of variable profit 
with respect to price when demand is completely inelastic is 1.68; if (m / P) = 0.73, it is 
3.68. 
Some evidence indicates that the demand for pharmaceuticals is completely 
inelastic: a study by Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz (1991) found that the total amount 
sold of a drug in both generic and brand-name forms did not increase after generic entry.
5  
Moreover, as Folland et al (2001) argue, insurance reduces the price elasticity, and 
prescription drug insurance coverage has been rising.  According to an April 2000 
Department of Health & Human Services Report to the President
6, in 1998 only 27 cents 
out of every dollar of pharmaceutical expenditure was paid for out of pocket by 
households; 53 cents was paid by private insurance and the remainder was paid by 
Medicaid and other sources (Figure 2-16).   
                                           
4 Product definitions and designation as branded or generic are determined by Multum, Inc. 
5 A choice-modeling experiment performed by Merino-Castelló (2003, p. 31) also provided evidence of 
low price elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals. 
6 Department of Health & Human Services (2000), “Report to the President: Prescription Drug Coverage, 
Spending, Utilization, and Prices,” April.   8
However, evidence from several studies suggests that the elasticity of demand for 
pharmaceuticals is positive, but not large.  One of these was the Health Insurance 
Experiment (HIE), which randomized people to various insurance plans that differed in 
their copayments and deductibles. The HIE yielded an elasticity of prescription drug 
expenditures of 0.27, implying that a 10% reduction in the price of drugs would increase 
spending by 2.7%. Lillard et al (1999) observed a similar response (0.25) among the 
elderly.
7  Goldman et al (2002) stated that “overall, the literature suggests elasticities that 
range between 0.20 and 0.35.”   
If (m / P) = 1/6, and the demand elasticity is 0.20, the elasticity of variable profit 
with respect to price happens to be equal to unity, the same as the elasticity of variable 
profit with respect to the number of consumers: 
 
δ ln ΠV  =         1         - β =         1       − 0.20 = 1 
 δ ln P       1 – (m / P)           1 –  (1/6) 
 
If the demand elasticity is 0.35, the elasticity of variable profit with respect to price 
equals 0.85, which is lower than the elasticity of variable profit with respect to the 
number of consumers, but not by much.  This suggests that the elasticity of variable profit 
with respect to price is likely to be similar to the elasticity of variable profit with respect 
to the number of consumers.  Hence, an estimate of the effect of the number of 
consumers on investment may also be considered an approximate estimate, or forecast, of 
the effect of price on investment. 
 
II.  Evidence about the effect of market size on pharmaceutical innovation 
 
  To estimate the effect of market size on pharmaceutical innovation, there must be 
observable, exogenous variation in market size (e.g. disease incidence) that can be linked 
to innovation measures.  Estimates of the incidence (i.e. the annual number of new 
                                           
7 The estimated elasticity is based on Goldman et al’s (2002) calculations, using the demand response 
shown in Table 4 of Lillard et al (1999) for elderly with Medicare only. Using information from the 
Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), they assumed the average coinsurance rate for these elderly 
is 100% without insurance and 45% with insurance. The 45% average coinsurance rate is based on our 
calculation of observed coinsurance rates (out-of-pocket expenditures divided by total expenditures) for 
people with private supplemental drug coverage in the 1995 MCBS.   9
cases)
8 of 365 conditions have been compiled and posted on the wrongdiagnosis.com 
website.   In most cases, the incidence rates refer to the U.S. or other industrialized 
nations.
9  Data for the top 25 conditions are shown in Table 1.   
Although these data are potentially useful, they may be subject to several 
limitations.  First, they were derived from a variety of sources, covering different regions 
and time periods, and may not be directly comparable.
10  A second and perhaps greater 
concern is that reported incidence may not be exogenous with respect to the availability 
of treatments.  An increase in available treatments for a disease may lead to greater public 
and professional awareness of it (e.g. due to more promotion and advertising by drug 
companies), and therefore to higher reported incidence.  
There is one important set of diseases—different forms of cancer—for which 
reliable, systematic incidence data are available, and where the potential for “reverse 
causality” (from treatment availability to incidence) is likely to be quite limited.  Reliable 
data on the incidence of cancer, by cancer site (e.g. breast and prostate) are available 
from GLOBOCAN.  The GLOBOCAN 2002 database provides estimates of the 
incidence and prevalence of, and mortality from, 27 cancers for all countries in the world 
in 2002.  The database has been built up using the huge amount of data available in 
the Descriptive Epidemiology Group of the International Agency for Research on Cancer 
(IARC), part of the World Health Organization.   Incidence data are available from 
cancer registries.   
If drugs were the only or primary treatment for cancer, or if drugs were often used 
to diagnose cancer, as well as to treat it, the possibility of reverse causality would be 
greater.  But drugs are not the only cancer treatment: as noted by the British Columbia 
Cancer Agency, surgery and radiation therapy, as well as cancer drugs, “are all proven to 
cure cancer, extend life, or improve quality of life.”
11  Also, data contained in the 
National Library of Medicine’s Unified Medical Language System Metathesaurus 
                                           
8 This measure differs from "prevalence", which is the cumulative number of people currently affected. 
9 http://www.wrongdiagnosis.com/lists/incid.htm 
10 Some of the estimates are based on household data (i.e. on self-reported medical conditions), while 
others are based on surveys of medical providers. 
11 See http://www.bccancer.bc.ca/PPI/CancerTreatment/default.htm.  There are also alternative cancer 
therapies; see http://www.bccancer.bc.ca/HPI/UnconventionalTherapies/default.htm.   10
indicate that only 0.4% of cancer drugs are used to diagnose cancer.  The vast majority 
(98.7%) are used to treat cancer; 0.9% are used to prevent cancer.  
  I will examine the relationship, across cancer sites, between cancer incidence and 
two different measures of pharmaceutical innovation.
12  The first is the number of distinct 
chemotherapy regimens for treating the cancer site.  The second is the number of articles 
published in scientific journals pertaining to drug therapy for that cancer site.   
  Cancer Care Ontario (CCO) publishes lists of chemotherapy regimens grouped by 
disease site.  The regimens are categorized according to the recommendations of the 
respective CCO Disease Site Group.  I will use the number of core chemotherapy 
regimens for a disease site.  A core therapy is defined as a “standard therapy; a regimen 
widely used by most Regional Cancer Centres in this disease site.”
13  Data on the number 
of new cases in Canada in 2002, by cancer site, were obtained from GLOBOCAN 2002.  
Data on the estimated number of new cases in the U.S. in 2000, by cancer site, were 
obtained from the SEER Cancer Statistics Review, 1975-2002.
14   
  Data on eighteen cancer sites, listed in descending order of incidence in Canada, 
are shown in Table 2.   In both Canada and the U.S., the top four cancer sites—lung, 
breast, prostate, and colorectal—account for about two-thirds of all cases.  They account 
for 46% of core chemotherapy regimens.  Figure 1 plots the log of the number of core 
chemotherapy regimens for a site against the log of the number of cases in Canada in 
2002.  Statistics from the regression of the log of the number of core chemotherapy 
regimens on the log of the number of cases in Canada in 2002 are: 
Regression Statistics       
Multiple  R  0.550452       
R  Square  0.302998       
Adjusted R 
Square  0.259435       
Standard  Error  0.84812       
Observations  18       
                                           
12 According to IMS Health, cancer drugs (cytostatics) account for about 5% of global drug expenditure.  
IMS Retail Drug Monitor, January 2005, http://open.imshealth.com/download/jan2005.pdf. 
13 Other categories include “local regimens” (regimens not widely used; used by fewer than four regional 
cancer centres) and “emergent regimens” (regimens which have not yet been accepted as standard 
regimens). 
14 See http://seer.cancer.gov/csr/1975_2002/results_merged/sect_01_overview.pdf.       11
         
 
ANOVA         
   df  SS  MS  F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 1  5.003104 5.003104 6.955448 0.017927 
Residual 16  11.50892 0.719307    
Total  17  16.51202         
         
   Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t  Stat  P-value   
Intercept -3.06576  1.651987 -1.8558 0.081997  
ln(CA cases)  0.525554  0.199276 2.637318 0.017927  
 
The elasticity of the number of chemotherapy regimens with respect to the number of 
cases is 0.53, and the estimate is significantly different from zero (p-value = .018).  A 
10% increase in the number of cases in associated with a 5.3% increase in the number of 
chemotherapy regimens.
15 
Now I will examine the relationship, across cancer sites, between cancer 
incidence and the number of articles published in scientific journals pertaining to drug 
therapy for that cancer site.  Data on the latter were obtained by searching MEDLINE 
(Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System Online), the U.S. National Library of 
Medicine's (NLM) premier bibliographic database of biomedical citations and abstracts.  
The subject scope of MEDLINE is biomedicine and health, broadly defined to encompass 
those areas of the life sciences, behavioral sciences, chemical sciences, and 
bioengineering needed by health professionals and others engaged in basic research and 
clinical care, public health, health policy development, or related educational activities.  
It contains approximately 13 million references to journal articles that appeared in over 
4,800 journals published in the United States and more than 70 other countries primarily 
from 1966 to the present.
16  
                                           
15 The elasticity is virtually identical when we use the log no. of cases in the U.S. in 2000 instead of the log 
no. of cases in Canada in 2002.  U.S. and Canadian incidence across cancer sites is extremely highly 
correlated. 
16 The great majority of journals are selected for MEDLINE based on the recommendation of the Literature 
Selection Technical Review Committee, an NIH-chartered advisory committee of external experts 
analogous to the committees that review NIH grant applications.  The majority of the publications covered 
in MEDLINE are scholarly journals; a small number of newspapers, magazines, and newsletters considered   12
References to articles are indexed with terms from NLM's controlled vocabulary, 
MeSH (Medical Subject Headings). MeSH is the National Library of Medicine's 
controlled vocabulary thesaurus. It consists of 22,568 descriptors in a hierarchical 
structure that permit searching at various levels of specificity.  The Medical Subject 
Headings Section staff continually revises and updates the MeSH vocabulary. Staff 
subject specialists are responsible for areas of the health sciences in which they have 
knowledge and expertise. In addition to receiving suggestions from indexers and others, 
the staff collect new terms as they appear in the scientific literature or in emerging areas 
of research; define these terms within the context of existing vocabulary; and recommend 
their addition to MeSH.  
At the highest (most general) level of the MeSH hierarchical structure are the 
following 15 headings: 
  1.  Anatomy [A] 
  2.  Organisms [B] 
  3.  Diseases [C] 
  4.  Chemicals and Drugs [D] 
  5.  Analytical, Diagnostic and Therapeutic Techniques and Equipment [E] 
  6.  Psychiatry and Psychology [F] 
  7.  Biological Sciences [G] 
  8.  Physical Sciences [H] 
  9.  Anthropology, Education, Sociology and Social Phenomena [I] 
10.  Technology and Food and Beverages [J] 
11.  Humanities [K] 
12.  Information Science [L] 
13.  Persons [M] 
14.  Health Care [N] 
15.  Geographic Locations [Z] 
 
We can search MEDLINE for all articles pertaining to particular diseases, and for articles 
specifically pertaining to drug treatment of those diseases.  For example, the search string 
“exp leukemia” identifies all articles in MEDLINE that pertain to any form of leukemia, 
and the search string “exp leukemia/dt” identifies all articles in the database that pertain 
to drug therapy for any form of leukemia.   
                                                                                                                               
useful to particular segments of NLM's broad user community are also included.  Citations for MEDLINE 
are created by the NLM, international partners, and collaborating organizations.    13
The MEDLINE data we have described refer to publication; my objective is to 
measure innovation.  I think that publication is closely related to, and a good indicator of, 
innovation.  The majority of the publications covered in MEDLINE are scholarly 
journals, and novelty is generally a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for 
publication in such journals.
17  However, the novelty criteria used by scholarly journals 
undoubtedly differ from those used by other authorities (e.g. the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office or Cancer Care Ontario’s Disease Site Groups). 
  Table 3 shows data on incidence in 2002, by region (less vs. more developed), 
and number of MEDLINE article citations, for 25 cancer sites as defined in 
GLOBOCAN.  I calculated both total and drug-therapy article cites for each cancer site, 
from which non-drug cites may also be computed: 
TOTAL_CITEi  = the total number of MEDLINE articles pertaining to cancer site i 
DRUG_CITEi  = the number of MEDLINE articles pertaining to drug therapy for 
cancer site i 
NONDRUG_CITEi  = other MEDLINE articles pertaining to cancer site i  
= TOTAL_CITEi - DRUG_CITEi 
 
Using the data in Table 3, I estimated the following four models: 
 
Model 1: ln DRUG_CITESi = α1 + βDW ln INC_WORLDi + ei 
 
Model 2: ln NONDRUG_CITESi = α2 + βNW ln INC_WORLDi + ei 
 
Model 3: ln DRUG_CITESi = α3 + βDM ln INC_MOREi + βDL ln INC_LESSi + ei 
 




INC_WORLDi  = the incidence of cancer at site i throughout the world 
INC_MOREi  = the incidence of cancer at site i in the more developed region 
INC_LESSi  = the incidence of cancer at site i in the less developed region  
 
  Estimates of these equations are shown in Table 4.  Estimates of model 1 indicate 
that the elasticity of MEDLINE drug cites with respect to cancer incidence throughout 
                                           
17 Novelty is also a necessary condition for patenting.  A searchable U.S. patents database exists, and some 
investigators have used patent counts and citations as innovation indicators.  However the U.S. patent 
classification system is much cruder than the MeSH classification system with respect to medical 
innovation, and is inadequate for our purposes.   14
the world is 0.60, and is significantly different from zero.  Estimates of model 2 indicate 
that the elasticity of MEDLINE non-drug cites with respect to cancer incidence 
throughout the world is virtually identical, and is also significantly different from zero.  
There is more publication (presumably indicating more research and innovation) related 
to cancers with higher incidence.  A 10% increase in cancer incidence is associated with a 
6% increase in both the number of drug-therapy publications and non-drug-therapy 
publications. 
  Models 3 and 4 distinguish between incidence in the more developed and less 
developed regions.  Model 3 indicates that the number of drug-therapy publications is 
related to incidence in the more-developed region but not to incidence in the less-
developed region.  Model 4 indicates that the number of non-drug-therapy publications is 
also related to incidence in the more-developed region but not to incidence in the less-
developed region, although the more- vs. less-developed difference between the 
sensitivity of the number of drug-therapy publications (βDM - βDL = 0.73) is almost three 
times as large as the more- vs. less-developed difference between the sensitivity of the 
number of non-drug-therapy publications (βNM - βNL = 0.27). 
I think that the most plausible explanation for the lack of a relationship between 
the incidence in developing countries and the amount of pharmaceutical innovation has 
been weak or nonexistent incentives for firms to develop medicines for diseases primarily 
afflicting people in developing countries.  Although the size of the developing-region 
market is large, the prices manufacturers expect to receive in this market are probably 
very low.
18   
 
III.  Discussion 
 
I performed two analyses of the relationship, across cancer sites, between cancer 
incidence and pharmaceutical innovation, using two different measures of the latter: the 
number of distinct chemotherapy regimens for treating the cancer site, and the number of 
                                           
18 Prices of other (non-drug) medical treatments (e.g., hospital care) are also undoubtedly lower in the 
developing region than they are in the developed region.  But the ratio of the expected drug price to the 
price of other medical treatments may be lower in the developing region (due to the low marginal cost of 
drugs).  This could explain why (βDM - βDL) is almost three times as large as (βNM - βNL).   15
articles published in scientific journals pertaining to drug therapy for that cancer site.  
Both analyses indicated that the amount of pharmaceutical innovation increases with 
disease incidence.  The elasticity of the number of chemotherapy regimens with respect 
to the number of cases is 0.53.  The elasticity of MEDLINE drug cites with respect to 
cancer incidence throughout the world is 0.60.  These estimates are quite close, despite 
the fact that the innovation measures used are quite different. 
If the ratio of price to marginal cost for branded drugs with patent protection is 
about 6:1, as some evidence suggests, then the elasticity of variable profit with respect to 
price is likely to be similar to the elasticity of variable profit with respect to the number 
of consumers.  This suggests that the elasticity of innovation with respect of price is 
similar to the elasticity of innovation with respect to market size, which I estimate to be 
in the .53 to .60 range.  This estimate is very consistent with Giaccotto, Santerre and 
Vernon’s (2005) estimate (0.583) of the elasticity of pharmaceutical industry R&D with 
respect to the real price of pharmaceuticals.  That study employed time series 
econometric techniques to explain R&D growth rates using industry-level data from 1952 
to 2001.  
A recent paper by Abbott and Vernon (2005) suggests that the elasticity of 
innovation with respect to price may be somewhat higher.  Using Monte Carlo 
techniques, they model how future price controls in the U.S. will impact early-stage 
product development decisions within the context of a net present value framework that 
appropriately reflects the uncertainty associated with R&D project technical success, 
development costs, and future revenues.  Using partial-information estimators calibrated 
with the most contemporary clinical and economic data available, they estimate that 
cutting prices by 40 to 50 percent in the U.S. will lead to between 30 to 60 percent fewer 
R&D projects being undertaken (in early-stage development).   The elasticity of 
innovation with respect to price is therefore in the 0.67-1.33 range.  Since evidence from 
the 2002 MEPS suggests that the ratio of price to marginal cost is lower than 6:1, the 
elasticity of variable profit with respect to price is likely to be greater than the elasticity 
of variable profit with respect to the number of consumers, so my estimates seem 
compatible with Abbott and Vernon’s.     16
My estimates, and those obtained by other authors using very different 
approaches, imply that importation would be likely to significantly reduce the amount of 
pharmaceutical innovation.  It would also be likely to reduce employment in the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry.  We can get a rough assessment of the employment impact of 
reduced pharmaceutical innovation by examining the relationship, across pharmaceutical 
companies, between the number of innovations and the number of employees.  I defined 
the number of innovations by a company as the number of FDA-approved active 
ingredients contained in products sold by the company that are not contained in any other 
company’s products.
19  Data on the number of innovations by, and number of employees 
of, 14 selected major pharmaceutical companies are shown in Table 5.  Figure 2 plots the 
log of the number of company employees against the log of the number of innovations.  
The relationship depicted is highly statistically significant: the elasticity of employment 
with respect to the number of innovations is 0.71 (p-value < .001).   
                                           
19 This measure was constructed from the Multum Lexicon database (http://www.multum.com/Lexicon.htm).     17
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1. Diarrhea 100.00% 1 in 1 272 million almost 100% annually (NIDDK)
2. Common Headache 90.00% 1 in 1 244.8 million
90% approximately; almost everyone gets 
some each year.
3. Dental caries 55.57% 1 in 2 151.2 million
2,534,161 annual cases in Victoria 1996 
(DHS-VIC)
4. Infectious Diarrhea 36.40% 1 in 3 99 million
99 million new cases in the USA 1980 
(Digestive diseases in the United States: 
Epidemiology and Impact – NIH 
Publication No. 94-1447, NIDDK, 1994)
5. Flu 36.00% 1 in 3 97.9 million
36 per 100 (NHIS96); 35 million annually 
up to 50 million annually (NIAID/CDC); 
10-20% yearly (NIAID)
6. Food poisoning 27.94% 1 in 3 76 million
about 76 million cases annually in USA 
(NIDDK)
7. Common cold 22.79% 1 in 4 62 million
62 million cases (NIAID); 23.6 per 100 
(NHIS96); estimated 1 billion colds in the 
USA annually; Children get 6-10 yearly, 
adults 2-4 yearly; over 60's less than 1 a 
year.
8. Mental illness 22.10% 1 in 4 60.1 million
about 22.1 percent of American adults 
annually or 44.3 million people (NIMH)
9. Injury 21.69% 1 in 4 59 million 59 million cases (IOM)
10. Hives 15.00% 1 in 6 40.8 million
about 15% Americans each year 
(NWHIC)
11. Chronic Sinusitis 12.83% 1 in 7 34.9 million
34.9 million cases per year in the USA 
1994 (US Government Statistics)
12. Depressive disorders 6.91% 1 in 14 18.8 million
estimated 18.8 million American adults 
annually (NIMH)
13. Sexually Transmitted Diseases 5.62% 1 in 17 15.3 million 15.3 million annual cases (NIAID)
14. Acute Bronchitis 4.60% 1 in 21 12.5 million
4.6 per 100 (NHIS96: acute bronchitis); 
14.2 million cases annually
15. Iron deficiency anemia 4.12% 1 in 24 11.2 million
187,979 annual cases in Victoria 1996 
(DHS-VIC); 20% women of childbearing 
age; 2% adult men (NWHIC)
16. Social phobia 3.70% 1 in 27 10.1 million 3.7% adults annually (NIMH)
17. Traveler's diarrhea 3.68% 1 in 27 10 million estimated 10 million (DBMD)
18. Enteroviruses 3.68% 1 in 27 10 million
estimated 10-15 million cases annually in 
USA (DVRD)
19. Post-traumatic stress disorder 3.60% 1 in 27 9.8 million 3.6% adults annually (NIMH)
20. Acute urinary conditions 3.09% 1 in 32 8.4 million 8.405 million new conditions (NIDDK)
21. Acute Nonulcer dyspepsia 3.01% 1 in 33 8.2 million 8.2 million new cases (1988/NIDDK)
22. Generalized anxiety disorder 2.80% 1 in 35 7.6 million 2.8% of the adult U.S. population (NIMH)
23. Middle ear infection 2.57% 1 in 38 7 million 7 million annually
24. Occupational Injuries 2.32% 1 in 43 6.3 million 6.3 million workers in 1994 (CDC-OC)
25. Obsessive-compulsive disorder 2.30% 1 in 43 6.3 million 2.3% adults annualy (NIMH)
Table 1









cases in the 
U.S. in 2000
Lung 20,648 11 164,100
Breast 19,540 21 182,800
Prostate 17,900 11 180,400
Colorectal 17,708 3 130,200
Lymphoma - Non-Hodgkin's 5,671 11 54,900
Renal 3,858 1 31,200
Uterine/Sarcoma 3,643 1 36,100
Leukemia 3,636 16 30,800
Melanoma 3,585 4 47,700
Pancreas 3,277 1 28,300
Gastric 3,132 4 21,500
Ovary 2,661 3 23,100
Central Nervous System 2,356 1 16,500
Myeloma 1,855 3 13,600
Cervix 1,502 2 12,800
Esophagus 1,378 3 12,300
Lymphoma - Hodgkins 838 2 7,400
Testis 775 3 6,900
Table 2
Cancer incidence and number of core chemotherapy regimens, by siteTable 3











for cancer site 
incidence 
of cancer 










Leukaemia C91-C95 138,971 30,529 175,898 124,202
Lung C33-C34 98,796 14,341 672,221 676,681
Non-Hodgkin lymphoma C82-C85,C96 52,485 9,064 149,191 151,096
Colon and rectum C18-C21 80,738 8,744 355,701 665,731
Ovary etc. C56,C57.0-4 38,142 7,636 107,541 96,769
Brain, nervous system C70-C72 106,896 7,435 114,630 74,549
Prostate C61 44,355 7,015 165,347 513,464
Liver C22 77,313 6,464 513,060 110,404
Melanoma of skin C43 46,321 5,039 29,352 130,815
Hodgkin lymphoma C81 22,973 4,628 34,264 28,033
Stomach C16 44,298 4,035 619,235 311,154
Bladder C67 28,574 3,711 130,971 225,242
Multiple myeloma C90 18,421 3,332 30,473 55,166
Testis C62 15,731 2,723 20,489 28,103
Pancreas C25 31,104 2,706 96,650 135,204
Cervix uteri C53 35,812 2,072 409,404 83,437
Oesophagus C15 22,324 1,857 386,435 73,875
Oral cavity C00-C08 36,013 1,683 183,033 91,141
Thyroid C73 24,347 895 81,656 59,199
Larynx C32 16,362 694 94,589 64,537
Nasopharynx C11 7,576 632 72,612 7,189
Other pharynx C09-C10,C12-C14 4,228 364 81,811 48,459
Breast C50 118,088 18,959 514,072 636,128
Corpus uteri C54 27,756 2,891 62,312 136,329
Kidney etc. C64-C66,C68 38,660 2,848 68,394 139,871
Table 3
Incidence in 2002, by region, and number of MEDLINE article citations, for 25 cancer 
sites as defined in GLOBOCAN
Page 1Model 1 2 3 4
dep. Var. ln DRUG_CITESi  ln NONDRUG_CITESi  ln DRUG_CITESi  ln NONDRUG_CITESi 
ln INC_WORLDi  0.597 0.598
std. err. 0.210 0.138
t-stat 2.850 4.330
p-value 0.009 0.000
ln INC_MOREi  0.670 0.433
std. err. 0.209 0.145
t-stat 3.200 3.000
p-value 0.004 0.007
ln INC_LESSi  -0.065 0.167




Estimates of the relationship between cancer incidence and the number of drug and non-drug 
MEDLINE citationsCompany
Number of active 
ingredients for 
which company is 
sole source Number of employees in 2003
PFIZER INC 48 122,000
GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC  -ADR 18 103,166
NOVARTIS AG  -ADR 18 78,541
AVENTIS SA  -ADR 10 75,567
ABBOTT LABORATORIES 26 72,181
ROCHE HOLDINGS LTD  -ADR 13 65,357
MERCK & CO 26 63,200
ASTRAZENECA PLC  -ADR 14 61,900
WYETH 15 52,385
LILLY (ELI) & CO 18 46,100
BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB 18 44,000
SANOFI-SYNTHELABO  -ADR 10 33,086
SCHERING-PLOUGH 8 30,500
NOVO-NORDISK A/S  -ADR 5 18,756
Table 5
Number of innovations by, and number of employees of, 14 selected major 
pharmaceutical companiesFigure 1
The relationship between incidence and innovation
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